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Currently, China has the biggest automobile industry in the world. China’s economic situation helped 
the automobile market, as the internal demand of passenger cars increased substantially in the last years. 
Chinese automobile industry’s astonishing expansion over the past years has attracted many foreign 
automobile groups. SEAT decided to enter the Chinese market, following its expansion strategy to enter 
new markets. 
The purpose of this study is to analyse and understand the strategic entry of SEAT in the Chinese market, 
hence the choice of an explanatory case study (Yin, 2003). This study extends this analysis by examining 
the chines automobile market, more specifically the demand, the market segmentation and the intensity 
of competition, reviewing the SEAT company history, their competitive positioning and resources. 
I conclude that, although the Chinese market has growing potential, SEAT has failed to achieve its initial 
objective. The company has not been able to create a brand awareness in the Chinese market, unlike 
other foreign brands that have managed to accomplish that. This occurred, mostly, because of the high 
prices in comparison to its competitors due to additional import cost, such as import duties, 
transportation and distribution. 
 
Acknowledgement 
I would like to express the deepest appreciation to my advisor Professor Luís Almeida Costa, who 
encouraged me to pursue this topic and spent extra time helping me achieving a clearer structure. 
Without his supervision and constant help, this work project would not have been possible. 
I would also like to acknowledge the support of Luís Rosa, After Sales Manager of SEAT Portugal, 
and Jordi Cuesta, Brand Representative of SEAT in China, for their help to get access to relevant 




Finally, yet importantly, I would also like to acknowledge with much appreciation the crucial role 
of the staff of Library, especially Hermínia Martins, who helped me find some necessary and 
important papers for my research. 
THE CASE 
In April 2011, the former Chairman of SEAT, James Muir, announced in the Shanghai Motor Show 
that SEAT would expand to Chinese market in 2012. “SEAT is a brand on the move – a brand that 
is growing in its existing markets, with loyal, passionate customers’ base, and now expanding into 
new markets. This is the most exciting time in the company history and I am confident SEAT will 
establish a unique position in the Chinese market, as we have in every market we operate” (SEAT 
Press, 2011). 
The brand strategy was to expand to a new market, and China has been showing outstanding 
economic growth, as well an increasing automobile demand. James Muir believed that China was 
a great market for brand expansion, since demand had been specially growing around the young 
customers that sought for sporty alternative and differentiated design.  
SEAT’s objective was to launch the brand in April 2012, starting with eight showrooms1 located in 
urban areas, defined as highly dynamic. After entering the Chinese market, SEAT progressed at a 
slower pace than expected, with 2,200 units sold and 12 dealerships open in 2012, compared to the 
planned 4,000 units and 15 points of sale.  
The actual SEAT Chairman, Jürgen Stackmann, stated in an interview to Just Auto that SEAT was 
considering building cars in China, and the initial plans to expand to China from the SEAT base in 
Martorell failed because of high import duties and distribution problems (Brooks, 2013). Was 
SEAT ready to compete in the Chinese market? Did SEAT had the right strategy? How can SEAT 
become more competitive in the Chinese market? 
                                                          





On a global perspective, the automobile industry is one of the most vital industries in the world. The 
automobile sector has an impact in the economic activity in a variety of ways. It is a global driver 
for innovation, economic growth, income increase, and a source of employment. 
When, in 2008, the global economy was stuck in the global recession, worldwide vehicle production 
experienced a decrease of 3.7% relative to the 73 million units built the previous year (Exhibit 1). 
The impact of the downturn was particularly pronounced for U.S. automakers, with a decrease in 
production of about 19.3% in 2008 and 34.3% in 2009 (Exhibit 2). The major U.S. assemblers 
struggled to reach the end of the year, whereas China’s automobile industry continued on the path 
of growth, though at slower rates. Over the past eight years, the automobile world sales grew on 
average 4.4% each year. In 2010, the automobile market reacted positively after the 2008 crisis, 
increasing sales by 14.1%. The automobile sales growth rate stagnated in the following years, with 
values of 4.4%, 4.9% and 4.5%, in 2011, 2012 and 2013 respectively. (Exhibit 3). 
 
CHINESE MARKET 
The expansion of China’s automobile industry has been influenced by the political and economic 
situation of the country. The industrialization in China has been centrally determined by distinct 
industrial policies. In 1953 the construction of the First Automobile Works (FAW), in Changchun, 
was established, with the technological assistance of the former Soviet Union (Tao, 2004).  
As China’s economy developed, the automobile market did, however, undergo some changes. 
During the period of the Centrally Planned Economy, the biggest domestic automakers were unable 
to meet the domestic demand, which were controlled by the central government. Therefore, during 
the 80s, foreign automakers were allowed to form joint ventures with state-owned Chinese partners, 
where foreign ownership was limited to 50 percent. For example, SAIC and FAW with 




industry, gaining technological and operational expertise from foreign companies while still 
controlling the industry. After the 90s, several national corporations entered the industry, such as 
Brilliance China Auto, Chery Automobile and Gelly Automobile.  
The expansion of the Chinese Automobile Industry has increasingly attracted attention from 
automakers around the world. In 2001, China started to become more integrated with the world 
economy, especially thanks to China’s WTO membership (Bhadrapur, 2012). The market 
liberalization promoted an increase in foreign investment, as well as imports of cars and car-parts. 
 
The Demand 
The main driver of the Chinese automobile industry is the country’s economic development. China 
showed, over the past nine years, an average of 10.1% GDP growth (Exhibit 4). The internal 
demand for passenger cars increased substantially, driven by rising incomes and a growing middle 
class creating a larger consumer culture. In addition, it was also caused by supportive industry 
policies from the Chinese government, which continues to play an important role in encouraging 
the growth of the industry.  
China automobile sales have shown very rapid growth, on average of 19.04%, in the past nine years, 
and incredible growth levels of 45.5% in 2009. In 2010, the Chinese automobile market reached 
the world’s record of vehicle sales, with 17.79 million units, and has grown to impressive 21.95 
million units sold, 4.05 million in the commercial and 17.9 million in the passenger car segment, in 
2013 (Exhibit 5). 
The sales growth fell to 2.5% in 2011, due to a slowdown in credit conditions, that are becoming 
tighter, and subsidies for automobile purchases, offered between 2009/2010, were removed 
(CEIBS, 2004). The government has also imposed new restrictions on licensing, so as to reduce 
traffic on major cities. Nevertheless, the growth rate rose again in 2012 to 4.3%, and to 13.9% in 




Regardless of rapid sales growth over the past years, car ownership rates in China remain low by 
international standards. China still has a third of the global average (44 per 1,000 people in 2010 vs. 
124 globally) and far below the average for OECD economies (402 per 1,000 people in 2010) 
(Exhibit 7). 
According to McKinsey (Wang, Liao and Hein, 2012) “the growth of China auto market will slow 
to an average of 8% a year between 2011 and 2020, still very fast by developed-world standards”. 
McKinsey’s forecast also alerts to the fact that, by 2020, China’s new car sales are expected to 
exceed the figures of the European and North American markets, reaching 22 million units per year 
– a record annual growth of the global automobile market of 35%. 
 
Market Segmentation 
Vehicles in China do not have a formal characterization or regulation; hence, the automobile 
Industry can be divided into two segments: Commercial Cars and Passenger Cars. In each category, 
they can also be sub-divided. According to the Organisation Internationale des Constructeurs 
d'Automobiles (OICA), the Passenger cars category can be sub-divided into three sub-categories: 
Sedan, Multi-Purpose Vehicle (MPV) and Sport Utility Vehicle (SUV). Sedan cars can be also 
segment by model-sizes in A, B, C, D, E, and F. According to McKinsey (Wang, Liao and Hein, 
2012), China’s forecast for passenger car sales demand for 2011 was 80% of Sedan, 15% of SUV, 
and 5% of MPV. In 2013, passenger car sales was 66.9 % of Sedan, 16.67% of SUV, 7.28% of 
MPV and 9.06% for Minivan, showing that Chinese customers prefer the Sedan segment. The 
analysis of Table 1 allows concluding that, in 2013, the first nine best-selling Sedans are notchback 
models, as well as the majority of the 100 best-selling Sedans. It was also predicted that, by 2015, 
the demand for the Sedan segment would decrease to 76%, and to 73% in 2020.The only segment 
for which demand would increase is the SUV cars, 19% in 2015 and 22% in 2020. MPV will 




Commercial vehicles can be sub-divided into three categories: Light Commercial, Trucks, and 
Buses. Commercial vehicles sales in China suffered negative impact by the economic slow-
down.  While declining by 6.3% from 2010 to 2011, the commercial segment experienced a further 
decline of 5.5% in 2012 to 3.81 million units, compared to 4.03 million sold in 2011. Before 2010, 
the commercial vehicle segment had a positive growth of 22.3 %, between 2005 and 2010(Exhibit 
8). In contrast, passenger car sales grew about 21.7% on average in the past 8 years. Lower growth 
levels were featured only in 2008 (7.3%) and between 2011 and 2012 (5.2% and 7.5% respectively) 
(Exhibit 9).  
Over the past few years, it may be verified that the passenger car segment had always overlapped 
the sales of commercial vehicles. Presently, passenger cars is the segment that holds the largest share 
in sales (80.3%), compared with commercial vehicles (19.7%) (Exhibit 10). 
 
Intensity of Competition 
In order to satisfy the Chinese automobile demand, both foreign and native automakers rapidly 
increased investment in the industry. In recent years, the production of automobiles in China rose 
by 19.5% on average. In 2008, there was a significant drop in the production growth rate to 5.2 %, 
offset in the following year by an astonishing growth of 47.6% (Exhibit 11). 
Between 2004 and 2012, the number of vehicles produced in China grew, on average, 15.6%, to 
approximately 9.35 million units per year (Exhibit 11). In 2010, China has become the world’s 
largest producer with 18.2 million units, surpassing the world biggest automobile producers: Japan 
with 9.6 million units, the U.S. with 7.8 units and Germany with 5.9 million units (Exhibit 12). 
The astonishing expansion of the Chinese domestic industry experienced great development, not 
only because of the positive domestic demand growth for passenger cars, but also due to 
international demand for reasonably priced automobile components. This attracted the attention of 




foreign firms that have been able to support their global financial results by the company’s presence 
in China. Nearly all of the world’s top automobile assemblers and suppliers have already invested 
in China – the competition is becoming increasingly fierce.  
The rise of China as one of the major producers, in 2010, was also sustained by an abundant supply 
of low cost labour. In 2002, a manufacturing employee in China earned, on average, 0.6$ per hour, 
having this value increased to 1.74$ in 2009. The hourly compensation rose to 13.3% per year 
during this period (Exhibit 13). In 2009, compensation per hour of a manufacturing employee in 
Germany was 49.56$, 33.53$ in the U.S. and 30.36$ in Japan (Exhibit 14). Compared with the 
major automobile producer countries, China has substantially lower rewards, making it, thus, a very 
attractive market for locating production facilities given the reduced labour costs. 
Recently, it is becoming easier for foreign automakers to enter domestic markets and China has few 
legal barriers to protect the existing companies from new entrants. Even though, Chinese 
government often protects its market by introducing high import taxes.  
The automobile industry can be considered very concentrated, with the top 10 domestic 
manufactures having 86% of the Chinese’s revenues (Exhibit 15). It is important to take into account 
that all of these manufacturing groups produce for more than one brand, including foreign and 
domestic brands. Regarding the international groups in China, the top 10 represents 49% of the 
Chinese revenues (Exhibit 16), which demonstrates that foreign brands have the customers’ 
preferences comparing to domestic brands.  
China’s automobile market is transiting in its market dynamics, whereas in the past few years the 
market has behaved as “pull” (demand driven), and since the last 4 years it is adopting typical “push” 
(offer driven) behaviours. As an example, price discount offered to customers has increased from 




for all brands combined with the declining situation in their traditional markets, such as Europe and 
the U.S. to achieve their global sales volumes.  
Nowadays, customers search for information before purchasing a car. They compare brands and 
models, gaining more negotiation power. Customers now have the power to negotiate payment 
terms, financing rates, trade-in values of the leasing and the possibility to buy cars from the previous 
year with high discount. Customers can easily choose alternative car brands and they are very price 
sensitive, basing their decision on vehicle cost and performance. Vehicles with improving 




Sociedad Espagnola de Automoviles de Turismo or SEAT started out in 1950 with the help of the 
Instituto Nacional de Industria and an alliance contract with Fiat. The construction works for 
SEAT's Zona Franca plant began on 1950 and the opening day came on June 5, 1953. SEAT cars 
were simply rebadged and slightly modified Fiats. When, in 1981, Fiat pulled out of the deal, the 
Spanish manufacturer needed the expertise and funds of a much bigger and older car producer. This 
time SEAT would turn to Germany for a partner and it would find it in Volkswagen (VW), with 
whom it signed a deal in 1982. 
After that, SEAT cars started achieving a certain recognition in European markets based on their 
Mediterranean design combined with German technology, and started exporting to Europe in 1983. 
Soon, the brand became a lot tighter as, in 1986, the German automaker purchased 51% of SEAT 
and then increased to 75% by the end of that year. Just 4 years later, VW bought the whole of SEAT, 






Competitive Positioning  
SEAT offers its customers a unique combination of Mediterranean design, dynamic performance 
and high quality German engineering and technology, and establishes a strong dealer network.   
SEAT’s target groups are those defined as “joy” and “lifestyle”, meaning those focusing on self-
realization, personal independence and freedom, being open to new ideas and influences, caring 
about balance between job, leisure and self-enjoyment. These groups are composed, mainly, of 
males under 30 years old, either single or married, mostly without children, with medium or high 
education, students, graduates and young professional in their first work experience, with medium 
incomes.  
SEAT’s promise is to deliver “ENJOYNEERING” to its customers. To live up to this brand 
promise, SEAT incorporates three core values and nine sub-values into its products: Dynamic 
(Sporty, Exciting and Modern Tech), Young Spirited (Passionate, Urban and Progressive), Design 
Driven (Detail, Individual and Tempered). 
 
Resources 
SEAT is the sole active Spanish brand with a mass production potential and capability of developing 
its own models in-house. The company has a strong brand reputation and possesses distinctive 
resources, which ascribes the company competitive advantage. “We define firm resources as all 
assets, capabilities, competencies, information knowledge and reputation that are owned or 
controlled by the firm and that enable the firm to conceive of and implement strategies that improve 
its efficiency and effectiveness” (Cool, Almeida Costa, Dierickx, 2006, p. 55).  
Integrated into the VW Group organizational structure, SEAT’s China business unit is part of the 
multi-brand group hosting all the group brands exploiting and sharing resources from the group. “A 




(Cool, Almeida Costa, Dierickx, 2006, p. 55). A competitive advantage that allows the firms 
recording great sales growth at both the domestic and international levels. 
Among several resources, innovation seems one of SEAT’s core competences. The innovation 
projects of the VW Group make the corporate brands more competitive than in other industries. In 
2011, the Group secured 3,182 patents, of which 1,418 were in Germany and 1,754 abroad. The 
large number of patent applications indicates the highly innovative nature and prevents the 
competitors from imitating the technologies. 
Even though the worldwide sales revenue of €6.1 billion and 6.9 €billion in 2012 and 2013, and the 
fact that operating profit has been negative in 156 million and 152 million euros, respectively. The 
VW Group recorded sale revenues of €197 billion euros and an operating profit of €11.7 billion 
euros in 2013 (VW Group Annual Report, 2013). Therefore, second resource is financial stability 
and flexibility that Volkswagen Group guarantees to their associated brands. 
SEAT also gains competitive advantage through its superior physical resources. According to the 
VW Group report, it operates 106 production plants in 19 European countries and a further 8 
countries in the Americas, Asia and Africa. Although the SEAT assembly plant is only located in 
Spain and Portugal, the VW Group is building many components in-house, across the several 
plants, instead of buying those components to other suppliers, they reduce cost and increase profit 
from in-house production.  
The VW Group control system by IBM Demand Workplace Solution can be considered as a key 
resource. It is designed to simplify and automate the process by which employees and suppliers 
capture, access, analyse and use information. Its system improves the capability to consolidate 
technology and production skills into competences, so the company can adapt quickly to changing 




Another main resource of SEAT, which contributes to the company’s ability to differentiate its 
products, is a distinctive combination of German Engineering with Mediterranean design. This 
resource can also be aligned with product development; SEAT has placed considerable focus on 
developing new product, and has concentrated in taking various approaches to reducing fuel 
consumption and emission levels, integrating a wide range of innovations into fuel-efficient and 
low emission mobility solutions.  
Furthermore, the manufacturing capabilities in the VW Group also play an important role in 
helping SEAT to achieve competitive advantage. The modular strategy implemented by VW 
enables it manufacturing diversified products at competitive costs, thereby allowing it to maintain 
the individuality of the models. The VW Group factories become multi-brand facilities, allowing 
VW, SEAT, Skoda and even Audi to build on the same line, being able to switch production, 
enabling the facilities to run at much higher capacities. 
 
SEAT IN CHINA 
Following the company’s strategy expansion into new markets, SEAT decided to enter the Chinese 
market. Its initial objectives were to open 15 dealerships and sell 4,000 units by the end of the year. 
All of the dealership selected regions have between 5 and 10 million inhabitants, with GDP per 
capita income above average and growing industries.  
The Spanish brand plans were to launch, as well, for the first time in China, its new brand identity: 
a new logo and a new dynamic to engage its customers, state-of-the-art dealerships that have a new 
design and the latest technologies, which reflects SEAT’s core value. The aim is to appeal to all its 
clients’ senses: sight, hearing, touch, smell and taste. 
SEAT’s market penetration approach was to enter the Chinese market as an imported brand 
from Europe, belonging to the VW Group with high quality and trustworthy, at a premium price 




people who enjoy living, driving, who like to feel unique, different from the crowd and open to new 
or unknown products.  
SEAT’s objective was to establish the brand in China, increasing brand awareness to make it 
familiar to customers, offering a unique combination of Mediterranean design, dynamic 
performance and high quality German engineering and technology, and establishing a strong dealer 
network. The brand also wished to create a high-value brand image through imported market as a 
clear positive differentiation to the remaining volume brands. 
Its target group are youth-at-heart, open-minded, self-confident, joyful and urban males, under 30 
years old, either single or married, mostly without children, with medium or high educational level. 
Finally, its competitors in China are other imported car brands or even international brands with 
local production with similar products (same segment / bodyline). The strategic positioning in China 
is below Volkswagen and Volvo and against Fiat and Mazda. 
The product range of SEAT China  was a set of the top models, only if compared with the Europe 
standards. According to SEAT, its products’ strengths are the emotional eye-catching design, 
dynamic striking character, thrilling sport driving and fun-to-drive, including the most modern 
technologies, and the most premium and high specifications available. 
The brand focused only in A and B segments, differentiating from its competitors by providing 
superior products in terms of quality, design, innovation and technology. Such attributes are unique 
values that customers appreciate and are willing to pay for a premium price. 
SEAT intentions has been to start launching the Leon model and, by the end of 2012, it intended to 
present the Ibiza family model. Furthermore, it also wanted to extend its options to the Alhambra 
model. 
At this moment, SEAT China offers three models: Ibiza within A0 segment with hatchback 




The Leon model falls within the A segment with hatchback bodyline. Leon is available in three 
versions: FR, FR Plus and Cupra. Finally, the Alhambra models fall within the B or MPV segments, 
with only one version. Ibiza’s price range is between 149,800 and 188,800 RMB, Leon is from 
243,900 to 294,600 RMB and Alhambra is from 299,200 to 365,700 RMB. SEAT China also 
provides after-sales services for its customers: car maintenance and repairs. 
Two of SEAT’s core worldwide competitors within the imported market are Opel and Ford. Opel 
is still not present on the Chinese market, but Ford is present and is competing within the same 
segment with the Focus model. Focus is now produced in China and, in 2013, it sold 207,376 units; 
moreover, the Focus model price range is from 104, 800 to 148,800 RMB. Overall, Ford sold 
678,951 units in China. 
The absence of A and A0 segments on the Renault portfolio in China makes Mazda and Fiat, 
currently, the two brands that suit best the SEAT brand positioning within the Chinese imported 
brand market. Mazda offers two models, Mazda 2 (cost 75,800 up to 101,800 RMB) and Mazda 3 
(cost 112,800 up to 149,800 RMB) that fit within the A0 and A segment, and both models are 
assembled in China. Fiat only offers one model in the same segment, Ottimo (cost 95,000 up to 
145,000 RMB), which is also produced in China. In 2013, Mazda sold 184,257 units and Fiat sold 
48,375 units. Finally, there are Kia and Hyundai, which do not fit into SEAT’s positioning, but they 
are important to keep as reference due to their strong presence in the Chinese market and high sales 
volumes (Hyundai sold 1,030,808 unit and Kia 546,766 units). Both brands have models in the A0 
and A segments, and are producing in China. Comparing with the main competitors, SEAT presents 
much lower numbers. According to SEAT, one of the main reasons for the weak sales is the fact 




Since it opened its first eight dealerships, SEAT has sold approximately 2,200 vehicles in the first 
year, numbers that are far below the 4,000 units initially predicted (Yan, 2011). The Spanish brand 
also forecasted to open more dealerships, up to 15 dealerships in total, but only opened four more.  
In the first three months of 2013, the brand only sold 539 units, 771 units at the end of nine months, 
ending the year with merely 1,100 units sold. Moreover, in the first quarter of 2014, it only sold 179 
vehicles, presenting numbers far below the ones originally predicted (VW Group News, 
2013/2014). 
As an imported brand produced in Europe, SEAT production costs are higher than its competitors’ 
that have already started to produce in China. By producing abroad, SEAT has to face other costs 
associated with the importation, such as the import duties imposed, as well as the cost of 
transportation and distribution. These extra costs are reflected in the price of automobiles, forcing 
SEAT to charge higher prices than its competitors do (though to position itself as a premium brand 
imported), in order to gain profit margins. 
Despite SEAT reputation and brand recognition, it continues to be unknown in China (Brooks, 
2013); this lack of brand awareness prevents the brand from getting new customers from other 
brands.  
Finally, as an imported brand, SEAT assumes the entire risk. Assuming that SEAT starts producing 
in China, it would be mandatory to have a partnership with a local manufacturer, which would take 
half the risk along with the brand. 
 
DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 
1. How attractive is the Chinese Automobile Industry? 
The attractiveness of an industry depends not only on demand size and growth, but also on 
competition intensity. The competition intensity in a given industry is largely determined by the 




performance of its firms” (Besanko, 2013). According to Porter (1980), the competition intensity 
in a certain industry require five forces: Context of strategy of a rivalry of enterprises, the threat of 
potential entrants, the threat of substitute products and services, and also customers and suppliers’ 
bargaining power. 
In recent years, China has become the world’s fastest growing automobile industry producer and 
seller. Chinese automobile market sales have grown 19.04% on average in the last 9 years. A 
McKinsey forecast predicts that, although the automobile market will continue to growth, average 
growth will slow down to 8% until 2020.  
The average car ownership in China, in 2010, was 44 car per 1,000 people, a low number comparing 
with the world average of 124 per 1,000 people and with the OECD economies of 402 car per 1,000 
people. These figures show that China has a high growth potential, and in a market with a high 
growth levels, it is less likely for companies to start a price war. In order to satisfy the increasing 
demand, the production has also grown on an average 19.5%, and, in 2010, China became the 
world’s biggest producer. 
The rapid ascension and growth potential of the Chinese market attracted several international 
automakers that are greedy to expand to a new market, since China has few legal barriers to protect 
the existing companies from new entrants and the car production costs are lower than in the country 
of origin. The tensions have begun with all the world’s leading global automakers building 
production facilities and seeking to dominate the local market. Consequently, there is expected 
possible high retaliation from existing companies, if new companies bring innovative products and 
ideas into the industry. Nevertheless, the industry is very mature and it has strongly reached 
economies of scale. Therefore, to survive in this market, key economies of scales must be obtained. 
Moreover, customers nowadays have more access to information; they search for information 




gaining more negotiation power. Customers have become more price sensitive and can effortlessly 
choose another brand, basing their decision on a trade-off between cost and performance. 
2. How you evaluate SEAT decision to enter Chinese market? 
Despite having already entered the Chinese market for more than two years, SEAT has still been 
unable to achieve its initial objectives. Even with a relatively easy goal of 4,000 units on the first 
year, sales have been declining quarterly, unlike the Chinese market that has grown in recent years, 
and has prospects of growth. 
SEAT’s decision to enter the Chinese market is not a surprise, since the market has high potential 
growth perspectives. However, SEAT’s strategic entry was not adequate for the market. 
The first problem was the brand strategic positioning in the market as a premium-imported brand. 
The production costs in Europe are higher than in China, mostly because of the labour costs that are 
lower in China. The costs also increase because of the costs associated to the import, such as import 
duties imposed by the government, transportation and distributions costs. 
The second problem is SEAT’s small portfolio in China. The company only offers three models, 
all of them hatchback versions, which are not in accordance with the preferences of the Chinese 
customer. 
The last problem is the weak brand awareness. SEAT is still unknown to the Chinese customers 
and, as a premium, if the brand image is very weak, the customer perceived benefits would decrease. 
Consequently, the price that customers are willing to pay would also decrease. 
 
3. Discuss the SEAT strategy and competitive positioning in China. In particular, what 
can SEAT do to become attractive?  
“A firm profitability depends jointly on the economics of its market and its success in creating more 
value than its competitors. The amount of value that a firm creates compared to competitors 




SEAT decided to enter the Chinese market as an imported brand from Europe, belonging to the 
VW Group with high quality and trustworthiness, at a charging premium price which not all 
customers can afford. The products are a unique combination of Mediterranean design, dynamic 
performance and high quality German engineering and technology.  
SEAT’s core target group are mainly males under 30 with medium to high education, focusing only 
on two segments and with a narrow portfolio of only three models, all hatchback versions. SEAT 
pursued a differentiated focus strategy, which, according to Porter (1980), occurs when a firm 
“creates superior economic value within a narrow set of industry segment” (Besanko, 2013 p. 309). 
As an imported brand from Europe, SEAT has higher production costs than its competitors that are 
already producing in China. The producing costs in China are much lower than in Europe, mainly 
because of the lower labour cost comparatively with the one in Europe. In addition, SEAT has extra 
costs associated with the imports, such as shipping costs, import duties imposed by the Chinese 
government and distribution costs. Moreover, the brand still has a weak brand awareness in China, 
as SEAT is still unknown to Chinese customers.   
In order to become more attractive, SEAT should reposition in the market, and pursue a benefit 
leadership strategy. According to Porter (1980), a company can pursue a benefit leadership by 
matching the competitors’ prices and sell more than they do, or by charging a higher price and attain 
higher price-cost margins than its competitors.  
Consequently, SEAT should start producing in China with the help of the VW Group expertise and 
partnerships. In addition, reducing the production costs, SEAT would also cut all the shipping cost, 
import duties and distribution costs. 
Furthermore, the company would probably not have to invest in infrastructures. SEAT could start 
producing with the other VW Group brands, since one of the main resources of the VW Group is 




facilities, producing several models from different brands on the same line, switching production 
every time the company so wishes.  
By starting the production in China, SEAT could also reduce the automobile prices, becoming more 
competitive comparing to all of its competitors in China and, consequently, more attractive to 
customers who would perceive more affordable prices. 
Additionally, the brand should also offer more and different models, or continue to offer these three 
models, but with more version options, such as the notchback. As stated earlier, the notchbacks 
versions are the best sellers of sedans (Table1), clearly showing that the Chinese consumer’s 
preference goes for this type of car. 
As a final point, SEAT needs to expose the brand more, creating a strong brand awareness in China. 
This could, probably, be done through the investment in campaigns and introducing SEAT as a VW 
group brand, since the group is already established in this market. A brand with a strong image and 
reputation is more desirable to the customer. Consequently, there is an increase in the perceived 
benefit on the part of the customer, which is the consumer willingness-to-pay for a product 
(Besanko, 2013, p. 296). 
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Commercial Vehicle Sales in China 2005-2012 ( in Millions)
Sales Growth
Source: OICA 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Commercial Vehicle 1 787 088 2 040 011 2 493 990 2 624 893 3 313 479 4 304 142 4 032 698 3 811 195 4 055 221
Passenger Car 3 971 101 5 175 961 6 297 538 6 755 609 10 331 315 13 757 794 14 472 416 15 495 240 17 928 858
 Vehicles Sales in China by Segment 2005-2012
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
China 10 12 15 18 22 27 34 44
World 117 111 116 118 138 125 124 124
OECD members 387 392 394 395 400 405 405 402
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Beijing Auto 1489900 19.86%

















Top Best-selling sedans (hatchbacks or notchbacks) in 2013 
Rank Models Makers Deliveries 
1 VW Lavida, notchbacks Shanghai-VW 374,056 
2 Buick Excelle Shanghai-GM 296,183 
3 VW Sagitar FAW-VW 271,188 
4 VW Jetta FAW-VW 263,408 
5 Chevy Sail, notchbacks  Shanghai-GM 263,163 
6 Nissan Sylphy Dongfeng-Nissan 259,545 
7 Chevy Cruze Shanghai-GM 246,890 
8 VW Bora FAW-VW 237,156 
9 VW Passat Shanghai-VW 227,262 
10 Ford Focus, hatchback  Chang’an-Ford 207,376 
11 Hyundai Elantra Langdong Beijing-Hyundai 206,348 
12 Hyundai Verna Beijing-Hyundai 197,482 
13 Ford Focus, notchbacks  Chang’an-Ford 196,264 
14 Emgrand EC7 Geely 193,210 








Volkswagen Group 1628392 15%
Hyundai Grup 811341 8%
General Motors Group 784336 7%
Toyota Group 439861 4%
Renault-Nissan Group 391417 3%
Ford Group 330025 3%
Honda Group 309781 3%
PSA Group 279975 3%
BMW Group 20693 2%
Suzuki Group 124587 1%
Sales by Top 10 Manufacturing International Groups
Source: CAAM 
Source: CAAM 
